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Judgment aggregation is a rapidly developing research area in economics which at-
tracts the interest of several fields, such as law, political science and philosophy [3].
It studies how the individual opinions of an agent, which are opinions on logically
interconnected propositions, can be mapped into a collective judgment on the same
propositions. Dietrich and List showed that judgment aggregation is a generalization
of the aggregation issues discussed in Arrow’s impossibility theorem [1]. Whereas so-
cial choice theory studies the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a
collectively preferred alternative, judgment aggregation explores how to combine indi-
vidual judgments on specific propositions.
Unfortunately, likewise social choice theory, the field of judgment aggregation is
plagued by impossibility results (see, for example, [4, 6]), which generally state that
there exists no aggregation rule that generates complete, consistent and deductively
closed collective sets of judgments, while satisfying a set of seemingly rational condi-
tions. The conditions imposed on the aggregation rule aim to ensure the rationality and
the systematic approach of the aggregation procedure. The first impossibility result [4]
contained that all consistent and complete judgment sets are being considered for the
joint outcome (Universal Domain), and that all agents opinions are equally contributing
to the joint outcome (Anonymity). In addition, a (Systematicity) rule is imposed, which
ensures that the collective judgment on each proposition depends only on the individual
judgments on that proposition, and that the aggregation rule remains the same across all
propositions.
The hope for possibility results is seen in re-examining and relaxing these conditions
and, with systematicity being considered the most controversial, it has been weekend
to an Independence condition. The independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is
systematicity without the neutrality condition, requiring that all propositions are equally
treated. Just like Arrow’s independence condition plays a central role in his famous
impossibility theorem, the similar requirement leads to impossibility results in judgment
aggregation.
However, these formal frameworks ignore an important distinction between aggre-
gating judgments and preferences, which becomes apparent in our study of the bench-
mark examples of these areas. In this paper we start by arguing that the distinction
between the premises and conclusions play an important role in the benchmark exam-
ples of judgment aggregation. By considering the notion of independence in judgment
aggregation frameworks, we observe that the distinction between premises and conclu-
sion is not taken into account. In these frameworks, the conclusion(s), individually or
jointly obtained, are logically dependent on the corresponding premises. However, the
premises are independent from each other.
Based on our analysis, we introduce new independence assumptions that capture
the distinction between premises and conclusions. Recently, Mongin and Dietrich and
Mongin [5, 2] further relaxed Independence. We use Mongin’s framework, because his
notion of independence of irrelevant propositional alternatives enables us to formulate
our new independence assumptions and to define our operators based on a partition
between premise and conclusion propositions. In particular, we define:
1. A strong notion of premise independence, where the aggregated premise propo-
sitions depend on the individual judgments of this proposition, as well as on the
aggregated conclusion propositions.
2. A weak notion of premise independence, where the aggregated premise proposi-
tions depend on the individual judgments of this proposition, as well as on the
individual and aggregated conclusion propositions.
3. A strong notion of conclusion independence, where the aggregated conclusion propo-
sitions depend on the individual judgments of this proposition, as well as on the
aggregated premise propositions.
4. A weak notion of conclusion independence, where the aggregated conclusion propo-
sitions depend on the individual judgments of this proposition, as well as on the
individual and aggregated premise propositions.
Since in most cases there will be several premise propositions and only one conclu-
sion proposition, as in the standard example of the doctrinal paradox in the literature, the
first two assumptions will be more often used than the latter ones. Of the first two, the
strong notion already enables several interesting operators, which we illustrate using the
revised conclusion procedure and the conclusion dictator. In both cases the aggregation
may in some cases depend on the aggregated conclusion. For example, the conclusion
dictator ensures that the joint decision is always determined by herself, but he allows
the other individuals to influence the reasons why her decision is justified.
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